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Abstract 
 
Whether basic entrepreneurship can be inculcated amongst the poorest in society and serve 
as a route out of poverty remains an open question. We provide evidence on this issue by 
looking at the effects of a large-scale asset transfer and training programme which is 
targeted at the poorest women in rural Bangladesh. We use a randomized control trial 
research design, and survey all households in the community. This allows us to map the full 
social network of the beneficiaries, on multiple dimensions of interaction. We find that 
beneficiaries’ wealth levels and occupational structure converge to that of lower-middle 
class households.  Beneficiaries use their newly found wealth to purchase household 
durables, and improve their human capital, as measured by business skills and their health 
status. We find the programme affects the composition of beneficiary households’ networks: 
they form ties to wealthier residents after the programme. The programme also affects 
outcomes among social network members, but has no effect on households that are not 
socially connected to beneficiaries.  Our findings suggest that such programs have effects 
beyond beneficiary households, and that the network structures and outcomes in targeted 
communities are transformed by them. 
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1 Introduction
The poorest in any society are often bypassed by economic development. They often languish in
unrenumerative and insecure occupations without the skills or know-how to build a route out of
poverty. The question of how they might be reached and their lives transformed has therefore
become a pressing issue for organizations interested in promoting economic development.
There is a growing awareness, for example, that micro-nance, heraled by some as a key means
of releasing the business potential of poor entrepreneurs does not reach the poorest segment of
the population, who have no business opportunities to borrow for [Murdoch 1988, Baland et al
2008, Grameen Bank 2009]. This recognition has prompted a wave of programmes targeting ultra-
poor households. The distinctive feature of these programmes, compared to earlier cash transfers
and assistance programmes, is their aim to permanently raise the ultra-poor out of poverty by
providing business opportunities and skills training.
The worlds largest NGO BRAC has been the key innovator in this area of policy. They
developed their programme for reaching the ultra-poor over a number of years in Bangladesh. This
involved signicant amounts of eld observation, experimentation and tailoring. The BRAC ultra-
poor programme is now being copied and exported to a wide range of settings across the globe. A
range of micro-nance NGOs are implementing ultra-poor programmes in Haiti, Honduras, India,
Pakistan, Peru, Ethiopia and Yemen. Whether basic entrepreneurship can be inculcated amongst
the poorest of the poor, however, remains an open question. This paper begins to ll this gap by
providing the rst results from a large-scale, randomized evaluation of the nationwide ultra-poor
programme in Bangladesh which was designed and implemented in collaboration with BRAC.
The programme aims to empower the poorest women in Bangladesh economically, socially and
psychologically, through a multi-faceted intervention. The targeted women receive business assets
(mostly livestock and poultry), business training, a stipend for a forty week period, health and
legal advice. The key feature of the programme is that the value of assets received is extremely
large in relation to beneciariesinitial wealth and represents a signicant injection of wealth into
the community.
The design and data collection strategy explicitly recognizes that ultra-poor households are
embedded in several types of social networks. For example these networks might be dened along
xed familial ties, or changing ties related to business transactions. Such networks can inuence
whether and how households that are not direct beneciaries of the ultra-poor programme, are still
a¤ected by the presence of the programme in their community. The nature of interactions between
households can also be a¤ected, hence the fabric of underlying networks in the community can
be a¤ected by such programmes. This might be especially so when the programme signicantly
increases the value of assets within the community. To understand these changes in our empirical
context, we thus collect detailed information on various types of social networks households are
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embedded within.1
This paper evaluates the e¤ect of the programme on the treated households, on the composition
of their networks, and on their network members, using a selected subsample of communities
where we surveyed every households. The e¤ect of the programme is identied as the di¤erence in
di¤erence before and after the programme in treated and control communities. We also separately
identify the community-wide e¤ects of the programme that operate through households being
socially connected to beneciaries from general equilibrium e¤ects of the programme through
prices and wages. To do so, we compare changes in outcomes between households in treated and
control communities that are connected to beneciary households, to those that are not connected
to them in any social network.
The analysis yields four sets of ndings. First, the programme has the intended e¤ect on direct
beneciary ultra-poor households. Namely treated households still have the assets one year after
the transfer, and their savings have increased as dictated by the programme. The asset transfer is
large enough to move the ultra-poor several steps up in the wealth distribution. Using community
dened wealth classes, after the transfer the ultra-poor move from being the poorest to being
close to the lower-middle class in their community. The asset transfer has signicant impacts on
the economic lives of these households as they abandon wage labor (either in agriculture or as
domestic servants) in favor of livestock rearing. Compared to other households in the village, the
occupational structure of the ultra-poor becomes indistinguishable from the middle classes.
Second, while we nd that the programme increases total per capita expenditure among bene-
ciaries, this e¤ect is not precisely estimated. However, we nd that treated households purchase
signicantly more durables, especially radios and bicycles. The programme also leads to the ac-
cumulation of human capital, measured both in terms of business skills and health status. Our
measure of business skills increases by 20%, and beneciariesBMI increases by 6%. This mag-
nitude of increase is large enough to overtake the average respondent in the two lowest classes.
Similarly, childrens z-scores increase by .72. However, while the e¤ects on BMI and z-scores are
not precisely estimated, they are large and lead to some optimism that larger and more precisely
measurable improvements may be achievable in the longer run.
Third, our survey allows us to create a full map of social networks within the community. These
networks are dened along di¤erent dimensions such as family ties, ties of informal insurance, and
market transaction ties in land, labor and credit markets. We show that the ultra-poor are embed-
ded in a rich web of networks. Among familial and insurance ties, these links are predominantly
with members of the lower classes. In contrast, market transactions take place between ultra-poor
and upper class households. We nd that the programme signicantly a¤ects the composition
of the ultra-poors social networks. In particular, the programme creates connections between
the ultra-poor and households in higher wealth classes, especially for market transactions. The
programme is thus e¤ective in giving the ultra-poor a chance to interact with individuals of higher
1Studies that have collected detailed information on the structure of family and other networks in village economy
settings have provided important insights on the role of social networks in learning about agriculture in Ghana
[Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Conley and Udry 2009], and child fostering in Burkina Faso [Akresh 2009].
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social status, thus opening up possibilities for better integration in society.2
Fourth, we nd that members of the ultra-poor householdssocial networks are also a¤ected
by the programme, but the e¤ect is heterogeneous depending on the nature of the network. In
particular, the ndings indicate that the large wealth shock experienced by ultra-poor households
benets the members of their family network, whose consumption and durables goods expenditures
increase, and the members of their informal insurance network, who experience an increase in
business skills. The di¤erence between the two networks is consistent with them having di¤erent
functions, so that family networks engage in wealth redistribution, and hence are a¤ected by a
permanent increase in the wealth of one of their members, whereas insurance networks only smooth
temporary income shocks and are therefore una¤ected by permanent increases in wealth. Finally,
the programme has no discernible impact on the outcomes of households that are unconnected
to the ultra-poor, e¤ectively ruling out the hypothesis that the ndings for connected households
are driven by common trends that di¤er between the treatment and control branch, or through
general equilibrium e¤ects through prices or local wages.
Our analysis contributes to the growing literature that evaluates interventions that aim to
transform the lives of the poorest in society. Emran et al [2009], for example, use panel data from
Phase I of BRACs ultra-poor programme and nd a signicant positive impact on income, food
consumption and security, durables and livestock, which is in line with our ndings. In addition
to evaluating the impact on the targeted households, we also show that the programme a¤ects
the composition of the social networks they interact with and selected outcomes of the network
members.
It is also part of a growing literature evaluating the spillover e¤ects of social assistance pro-
grammes in village economies. A number of these studies have exploited data used to evaluate the
PROGRESA social assistance programme in rural Mexico [Schultz 2004]. This followed a similar
research design to the data we use in that within each geographic location, treated and non-treated
households are observed, and a complete census of households is conducted.
For example, Angelucci and de Giorgi [2009] nd there to be indirect e¤ects on the consumption
of non-eligibles in treatment villages. They present evidence that this occurs through the insurance
and credit markets households indirectly benet from their neighbors higher income by receiving
more transfers, by borrowing more when hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock, and by reducing
their precautionary savings.3 In the same empirical context, spillover e¤ects in schooling choices
2Our analysis relates to the literature on risk pooling arrangements across households. While such ex post
risk pooling mechanisms have been documented in developing country settings, formal tests of the Pareto e¢ cient
allocation of risk being achieved at the village level are typically rejected [Townsend 1994, Ligon 1998, Dercon
and Krishnan 2000, Dubois et al 2008]. There is stronger evidence of risk pooling within ethnic groups [Deaton
1992, Udry 1994], sub-castes [Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005, Mazzocco and Saini 2009], and family and friends
[Rosenzweig 1988, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, La Ferrara 2003, Cox and Fafchamps 2007, Angelucci et al 2009b].
Our analysis also contributes to the literature on the e¤ects of extended family on other household behaviors, such
as for consumption [Altonji et al 1992]; inter-generational transfers [Cox and Jakubson 1995, Altonji et al 1997, La
Ferrara 2003, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2006]; childrenseducation choices [Loury 2006]; and non-resident parental
investments into children [Weiss and Willis 1985].
3Angelucci and De Giorgi [2009] and Gertler et al [2006] provide evidence that local food prices do not change
signicantly over time between treatment and control villages suggesting that any indirect treatment e¤ects are
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between treated and non-treated households have been reported by Bobonis and Finan [2008] and
Cattaneo and Lalive [2006], and Angelucci et al [2009a].4
Our main point of departure from this literature is to be able to identify spillovers from ben-
eciaries to non-beneciaries, pinpoint how these spillovers di¤er between households that are
connected to beneciaries and those that are not, to identify the type of social network these
spillovers operate through, and to assess whether the composition of the network is itself endoge-
nously a¤ected by the programme.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the programme, data, and research
design. Section 3 presents descriptive evidence on ultra-poor households and their networks at
baseline. Section 4 evaluates the e¤ect of the ultra-poor programme on beneciary households,
the structure of ultra-poor householdss social networks and outcomes among those households
that are and are not connected to ultra-poor households. Section 5 concludes.
2 BRACs Ultra-Poor Programme
2.1 Programme Description
BRAC, formerly known as the Bangladeshi Rural Advancement Committee, is the worlds largest
NGO with programmes in micro-nance, education, health, environment and social empowerment.
BRAC has been a pioneer in implementing programmes that target extreme poverty in Bangladesh.
This paper focuses on the second phase of this programme, which was started in 2007 and aims to
target 860,300 households in 40 districts of the country by 2011. The programme targets women
living in rural parts of the country who are unable to access and benet from mainstream poverty
reduction programmes and is currently being replicated in a number of countries around the world.
BRACs ultra-poor programme aims to economically, socially and psychologically empower
the poorest women in Bangladesh through a multi-faceted intervention. Targeted women receive
a combination of assets, such as cows, goats, poultry or seeds for vegetable cultivation. The asset
transfer is accompanied with skills training, specic to the type of asset provided. Furthermore, a
subsistence allowance is provided for the rst 40 weeks following the asset transfer, with the aim
of providing an opportunity for the beneciaries to spend some time learning to use the assets
to make a living out of them. The allowance enables them to smooth their income while they
quit occupations they may have had and devote more time to business activities related to the
transferred asset.
This highly intensive subsidized element of the programme only lasts for two years. Between 18
and 24 months into the programme, the beneciaries also take part in condence-building sessions
about how to use micro-nance and are enrolled in village-level micro-nance organizations.
Other components of the programme are a savings scheme, preventive and curative health care
not being driven by general equilibrium e¤ects of PROGRESA.
4Examples of well identied spillover e¤ects from other settings include health externalities from the eradication
of worms [Kremer and Miguel 2004].
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services and social development support involving training on legal, social and political rights. The
ultra-poor households receive monthly visits from a health volunteer and have access to BRACs
legal services. In addition, BRAC initiates the establishment of village committees that bring
together representatives from the village elite and from ultra-poor households.
2.2 Targeting
At the rst stage of selection into the programme, BRAC decides which districts to target. These
are chosen to be the poorest in the country in terms of human development indices. BRAC
employees from local branch o¢ ces then select the areas within a branch to be targeted by the
programme. Each area selected is referred to as a spot, which is a cluster of approximately 100
households and is smaller than a village.
The programme uses a combination of participatory wealth ranking methods and survey meth-
ods to identify the ultra-poor women that will be targeted in each spot. First, a participatory
rural appraisal (PRA) is conducted to divide all households in a spot into ve community dened
wealth bins and identify the poorest households, one being the wealthiest and ve the poorest.
The households ranked in wealth rank ve become the community-selected ultra-poor.
In the nal stage of targeting, BRAC workers visit the community-selected ultra-poor house-
holds and conduct a brief survey to determine who meets the programmes selection criteria. There
are three exclusion criteria, all of which are binding. If the household is already borrowing from a
micro-nance-providing NGO, is a recipient of a mainstream government anti-poverty programme,
or if there is no adult woman in the household, then it is automatically excluded from the pro-
gramme. Furthermore, a selected household has to satisfy three of the following ve inclusion
criteria: (i) total land owned including homestead is not more than 10 decimals; (ii) there is no
adult male income earner in the household; (iii) adult women in the household work outside the
homestead; (iv) school going-aged children have to work; (v) the household has no productive
assets. After further cross-checks to make sure that the information provided in the survey is
correct, the households that satisfy at least three of these criteria are dened as the Specially
Targeted Ultra-Poor (STUP) households. These represent the treated households in our analysis.
2.3 Evaluation Strategy and Survey Design
The data used in this study is part of a larger data collection exercise implemented in collaboration
with BRAC within a randomized evaluation strategy to measure the e¤ects of the ultra-poor pro-
gramme nationwide. Randomization is at the branch o¢ ce level, so that all spots within a branch
are either treated in 2007 or in following years. All ultra-poor households and a random sample
on non-ultra-poor households are surveyed at baseline and every two years until the programme
roll-out ends in 2011.5 Ultra-poor households are selected at the same time in both treatment
5We stratify at the sub-district level. To be precise, the choice of sample and the randomization of treatment
timing followed the following steps. First, the programme chooses all the area o¢ ces they want to treat (15 districts,
133 branch o¢ ces). Second, we determine districts in which there are upazilas with more than one branch o¢ ce.
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and control branches, using the same method outlined above. The only di¤erence between them
is that ultra-poor in treated branches receive the assets immediately whereas ultra-poor in control
branches will receive them in 2011.
To provide a more in-depth analysis of the interaction between the programme and social
networks, in two branch o¢ ces one treated branch and one control branch we surveyed every
household in all spots in the branch every year. These households are the subject of this study.
The two branch o¢ ces are located in the Naogaon district in North-west Bangladesh. This area
was chosen as it contained the nal two branch o¢ ces to be targeted by the programme within
their 2007 expansion, so it allowed us the maximum amount of time to survey everyone living in
the selected spots. The treated branch has 22 spots and 1620 households, the control branch has
13 spots and 923 households. Map 1 illustrates the distribution of spots within the study area. The
concern of there being spillovers between treatment and control locations is mitigated because:
(i) the shortest distance between a treatment and a control household is larger than 6 kilometers;
(ii) there is a major river owing between the two branch o¢ ces, reducing the likelihood of travel
between locations or their markets being integrated.
In the study area, the baseline survey was carried out between October 2007 and February
2008, the follow up fourteen months later between January and April 2009. Assets were transferred
between October 2007 and October 2008.6
The survey questionnaire measures a rich set of individual outcomes, including occupational
choices, income and expenditure, business and household assets, health, business skills, and em-
powerment. However, the distinctive feature of the survey that we exploit in this paper is its
coverage of social networks. Respondents are asked to list all the households they interact with
in each of the surveyed activities, thus for instance the land module lists all the households the
respondent lets land to and rents land from, the food consumption module lists all the households
the respondent gives food to and receives food from, and so on.
Given that we survey every household in the spot, we can fully map various types of networks at
the spot level. This detailed network mapping allows us to identify who the ultra-poor interacted
with before the programme and how these households are a¤ected by it. It also allows us to
see how the network structure and social standing of the ultra-poor households change with the
poverty reduction programme.
Then, for districts that contain upazilas that have more than one branch o¢ ce, we drop the upazilas with only
1 branch o¢ ce in them. Out of the rest, we: (i) randomly choose 2 upazilas for the Northern districts and 1 for
the Non-North districts. (ii) Within each upazila, randomly choose one control and one treatment branch o¢ ce.
For districts that do not have any upazilas with more than one branch o¢ ce in them (only one: Kishoreganj), we
randomly allocate one branch o¢ ce to control, and one to treatment.
6The fact that di¤erent households received assets at di¤erent points in time as the programme was rolled out
across spots in the branch raises the issue of heterogeneous treatment e¤ects, as households who had the asset
for longer had more time to adjust. In our sample, the median household had the asset for 9 months, and only
10% of the households had it for less than 5 months. Results are qualitatively similar if we restrict the sample
to households who had the asset longer than 5 months or longer than 9 months (the median). We note that the
sample used here might be too small to estimate heterogeneous e¤ects precisely. We defer the analysis of this issue
to the evaluation in the full sample.
7
3 Data Description
3.1 The Lives of the Ultra-Poor at Baseline
Table 1, Panel A, describes the characteristics of ultra-poor households and other households
belonging to each of the ve socioeconomic classes as ranked by the community. The rst row
lists the number and sample shares of households in each class. The sample contains 186 ultra-
poor households, accounting for 9% of the households in the spot on average. Twice as many
households were ranked in the same social class as the ultra-poor by the local community, but
were not selected by the programme. The next poorest class (class four) has the largest number
of households in the sample. Taken together the two bottom classes account for just over half
the sample households, while 18%, 14% and 13% of households belong to the middle and top two
classes, respectively.
The second row shows that, in line with the programme targeting strategy, ultra-poor house-
holds are more likely to be female headed. The share of male headed households is 55% for the
ultra-poor , 85% for the other households in class ve, and close to 100% for all other classes.
Household size (row three) is increasing in wealth, ranging from 3 for the ultra-poor to 4.8 for the
top class.
The next two rows show basic indicators of human capital, literacy as a measure of education
and BMI as a measure of health. In both cases we report measures for the survey respondent,
that is the main female in the household. Measures for household heads are correlated. Only 9%
of ultra-poor are literate and the share increases rapidly with wealth from 26% among leading
women in the bottom class to 55% in the top class. This gives a clear illustration of the low levels
of human capital in these villages.7 The next row show that BMI is also increasing in wealth, with
the ultra-poor being at the bottom of the lowest class with a 18.6 average, up to 20.9 in the top
class.8
The next three rows report measures of expenditure and wealth. Average per capita expendi-
ture by ultra-poor households is just under 60% of average per capita expenditure by households
in the middle class and just under 25% of average per capita expenditure in the upper class. Dif-
ferences in wealth are much starker. The corresponding gures for the value of household durables
are 23% and 6%, whereas for the value of business assets these are 2.4% and .03%, largely driven
by the fact that 42% of ultra-poor households have no assets at baseline. The Gini coe¢ cient for
wealth is .79, reecting the large degree of inequality in the distribution of assets.
The di¤erences in business assets translate into di¤erences in occupational structure. Panel
B reports the annual hours devoted to the four most common economic activities for women in
this sample as well as annual leisure hours computed as the hours not devoted to any economic
7The corresponding gures for male heads are only slighly higher, ranging from 20% in the bottom class to 66%
in the top class.
8In this setting, the relationship between BMI and health status is likely to be positive throughout, as the
heaviest among the wealthiest individuals (i.e. those weighing 2 standard deviations above the mean) are just on
the overweight threshold (25).
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activity, including household chores, which are the principal activity for women in our sample.
Three patterns are of note. First, ultra-poor households spend considerably more time selling
labor outside the household both as agricultural daily laborers and as maids, to which they devote
330 and 450 hours annually, respectively. The hours devoted to these activities fall rapidly as
we move up along the class structure and women in the middle and upper classes are very rarely
involved in these activities.
Second, in line with the skewed distribution of assets, and in particular livestock, ultra-poor
respondents devote much less time to livestock rearing. The average for the main female in a
ultra-poor household is 382 hours per year, compared to 815 for the main female in a middle class
household and 847 in an upper class household. Di¤erences in household chores exhibits a similar
pattern, presumably due to the fact that livestock rearing is typically done on homestead land,
hence it is easier to combine with chores.
Third, once we sum up the hours devoted to all economic activities, including minor activities
not listed in the table and household chores, leisure hours are very similar across wealth classes,
averaging about 6300 per year or 17 per day. This implies that even in the poorest classes women
are not underemployed, rather they are employed in activities (paid labor) that are likely to be
less remunerative. Rather than creating employment, we then expect the programme to change
the pattern of time use towards more remunerative activities.
3.2 Asset Transfers and the Distribution of Wealth
The average ultra-poor in our sample receives an asset valued 9958TK. In the context of the
distribution of business assets described in Table 1, the value of the assets BRAC transferred to
ultra-poor households is twice the mean value of ultra-poor business assets at baseline. For the
42% of ultra-poor households that had no assets at baseline the transfer obviously entails an even
more signicant change in wealth, but even for the average ultra-poor household that had some
assets at baseline, the transfer amounts to doubling the value of those assets.
The value of all the transfers to all ultra-poor households in each spot amounts to between
.1% and 6% of the value of all business assets in the spots. The transfers are thus a sizeable share
of existing wealth, amounting, on average, to 6 times the wealth of the lowest class, 33% of the
second lowest, 10% of the middle class and 6% and 2% of the two upper classes.
The size of the transfers relative to the value of existing spot assets implies that the programme
has a non trivial impact on the distribution of wealth, pushing the ultra-poor out of the bottom
and possibly above some of the lowest classes. To illustrate this, Figure 1A shows the kernel
density estimates of the distribution of log wealth in treated spots before and after the transfer.
The comparison of the two distributions clearly shows that a mass of individuals move from the
left tail to the center, with a considerable reduction in inequality. The two vertical lines represents
the average value of ultra-poor log wealth before and after the transfer, highlighting the fact that
the programme pushed treated ultra-poor a long way up the wealth distribution. A similar graph
for control spots (Figure 1B) suggests that this change did not occur where the programme did
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not operate.
To evaluate the impact of the ultra-poor programme on the distribution of wealth formally,
accounting for household characteristics and trends common to treated and control spots, we
estimate the following regression:
yit = 
1 +
P6
j=2 
jCji + 
1Ti +
P6
j=2 
jCji Ti + 
1Rt +
P6
j=2 
jCjiRt
+1TiRt +
P6
j=2 
jTiC
j
iRt + 
0Xit + it
(1)
where yit is log total wealth of household i in year t, C
j
i are class dummies for all classes above
ultra-poor , Ti = 1 if household i is in a treated spot, 0 otherwise, Rt = 1 if year t is after the
programme, 0 if before and Xit is a vector of household controls, which includes size, irreligion,
years of education of the respondent, maximum years of education in the household, respondent
age, marital status, whether the household receives government benets and an indicator for
whether the interview takes place during the lean season to account for seasonal di¤erences in
saving and consumption patterns.
The parameters of interests are j and j. j measures the di¤erence between the average
ultra-poor household and the average household in class j before and after the programme in
treated spots. j measures the di¤erence in di¤erence of the same quantity in treated and control
spots. Under the assumption that the change in control spots is a good counterfactual for the
equivalent change in treatment spots in the absence of the programme, the di¤erence in di¤erence
measures the e¤ect of the programme.
Table 2 shows that after the programme the ultra-poor become wealthier than non-treated
households in their same wealth class, and also wealthier than households in class four, thus
e¤ectively moving up two slots in the community wealth classication.9 The table shows that
both the simple di¤erences (bj + bj) and the di¤erence in di¤erences (bj) are precisely estimated
for all wealth classes. Moreover the two are quite similar, conrming, as already suggested by
Figure 1, that the distribution of assets did not change where the programme did not operate.
Estimates of (1) for the log of PCE, not reported for reasons of space, show a similar pattern
with ultra-poor becoming better o¤ than class four, and somewhat below the middle class. Simple
di¤erences and di¤erence in di¤erences estimates are also similar suggesting that no change took
place where the programme did not operate, but most coe¢ cients are imprecisely estimated, so
the evidence is suggestive but needs to be interpreted with caution.
The impact of the programme on the distribution of wealth within the spots, implies that the
programme is likely to a¤ect economic and social outcomes of households other than the treated
ultra-poor. Social networks are likely to be a key mechanism through which the programme
spills over onto non-treated households. To explore this hypothesis, the next section describes the
9In Table 2, the row titled "At baseline" gives bj + bj , the di¤erence between STUPs and wealth class j in
the treatment branch at baseline; the row titled "At follow-up" gives bj + bj + bj + bj , the di¤erence between
STUPs and wealth class j in the treatment branch at follow-up; the row titled "Simple Di¤" gives bj + bj , the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence between the STUPs and wealth class j at baseline and follow-up; the row titled "Di¤-in-Di¤"
gives bj , the triple di¤erence between the STUPs and wealth class j in treatment and control branches, in baseline
and follow-up.
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structure of the networks ultra-poor households are embedded in.
3.3 Ultra-poor Households and Their Networks
Given that we survey all households in the spot we can map entire networks at the spot level. To
simplify the exposition, we group network relationships into three categories. The rst includes
all households that are linked by family ties, the second all households that engage in economic
transactions (land rentals, credit and employment) and the third all households that engage in
insurance transfers (food exchange, assistance in times of crisis and other transfers in cash or
in kind). The sets are not exclusive, so that household i could belong to all three networks of
household j, if for instance i is part of js family, rents some land from them and gives them food
to cope with crisis.
To measure the network connections of ultra-poor households we count a household to be
connected to a ultra-poor if either the household or the ultra-poor lists the other among its
network members. While in many cases the two coincide (e.g. for family), allowing unidirectional
links has the advantage of capturing all available information when this is unlikely to be collected
on both sides, for instance, a ultra-poor will name their employer, but a large employer is only
asked to name his/her main employee for every business activity he may have.
Table 3 shows the share of households that are connected to ultra-poor households on each
of the three network dimensions, at the spot level by social class. The table shows that 25%
of households in the spot belong to the informal insurance network of at least one ultra-poor
household, 15% have family ties with a ultra-poor household and only 2.5% have economic ties.
These averages hide considerable variation within class. Indeed, 38% of ultra-poor households
belong to the insurance network of at least another ultra-poor household, but the share falls
quickly from 28% for households belonging to the bottom wealth class to 16% for households
belonging to the top class. This is consistent with insurance networks being formed assortatively
among people of similar wealth levels, but there is substantial sharing across wealth classes. The
next two columns separate the insurance networks according to the direction of the ows, whether
to or from ultra-poor households. The two are non-exclusive and indeed most households both give
and receive from ultra-poor households. This is particularly true at lowest wealth levels, whereas,
as expected, the upper classes mostly give and rarely receive transfers from the ultra-poor.
Family networks are also distributed by class but the gradient is atter, so that 20% of house-
holds in the bottom two classes are connected to at least one ultra-poor household, the share falls
to 12% for the middle and lower-upper classes and nally to 3% for the top class. Finally, economic
networks follow the reverse pattern as almost no households except the very richest employ, rent
land or give credit to the ultra-poor. Among the top class, 12% of households do.
Table 3 thus show that the ultra-poor households are embedded in a rich network structure
at the spot level. This opens up the possibility that this structure changes as a result of the
programme and that the programme itself a¤ects the outcomes of the households that have network
connections to the ultra-poor. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 evaluate the impact of the programme on the
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structure of the networks and their members.
4 Analysis
4.1 Programme E¤ect on Treated Ultra-poor
To evaluate the e¤ect of the programme on the treated ultra-poor households we use a di¤erence in
di¤erence estimator that exploits the variation before and after the programme between ultra-poor
households residing within the treatment and the control branch. As discussed in detail in Section
2, the same selection process was carried in all spots, but only selected ultra-poor in the treatment
branch received the asset. We restrict the sample to ultra-poor households and estimate:
yit = + Ti + Rt + TiRt + Xit + it; (2)
where yit is outcome of interest for household i in period t; Ti = 1 if household i lives in the
treated branch and = 0 if in they live in the control branch, Rt = 1 after the programme and 0
otherwise, Xit are household controls described in Section 3.2 above. The parameter of interest
is , the di¤erence in di¤erence between treatment and control before and after the programme.
Under the identifying assumption that the control spots represent a valid counterfactual for the
treated spots in the absence of the programme, namely that trends in all outcomes of interests are
the same in treatment and control,  identies the causal e¤ect of the treatment on the treated.
Imperfect compliance and drop-outs are not an issue in this context as all households who were
selected participated in the programme, and all of them stayed on until at least the follow-up.
Appendix Table A1 reports the means of key variables in treatment and control at baseline. As
is expected in a randomization over two units, there are some signicant di¤erences. In particular,
the ultra-poor are worse-o¤ in treatment spots, in terms of durables and human capital. They
also have a di¤erent occupational structure, with more hours devoted to wage labor and fewer
hours to husbandry and household chores. The key concern is that  might be contaminated by
reversion to the mean. This concern is partially ameliorated by the fact that similar di¤erences
between treatment and control also exist for non ultra-poor households (Tables A2 to A4), which
indicate that if the estimated  were to be solely driven by reversion to the mean, we should nd
the same e¤ect when we estimate (2) for non ultra-poor households. The fact that we do not (as
shown in Section 4.3 below) allays this concern.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 report the e¤ects of the programme on the variables that are
directly a¤ected by it, namely business assets and savings. The di¤erence in di¤erence estimates
indicate that business assets of the treated ultra-poor increase by 22,500TK, that is ve fold the
average value of business assets belonging to ultra-poor at baseline. Savings increase by 1,100TK,
a six fold increase from the baseline amount. Both e¤ects are precisely estimated at conventional
levels.
Columns 3 to 7 evaluate the e¤ect of the programme on ultra-poor time use. The programme
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increases the time devoted to livestock rearing by 560 hours, or 1.5 times the baseline amount.
Similarly, the programme reduces the time devoted to daily labor by 440 hours (1.3 times the
baseline amount), and to maid services by 1100 (over two times the baseline amount). The
programme also increases the time devoted to household chores by 420 (one third of the baseline
amount). The ndings show that the programme transforms the occupational structure of the
main female in ultra-poor households, and that the magnitude of the e¤ect is large enough to
make the occupational structure of the ultra-poor similar to that of the middle and upper classes
as described in Table 1. Finally, we nd that the change in time use is accompanied by an increase
in hours worked, as leisure falls by 420 hours, or 7% of the baseline amount.
Columns 8 and 9 evaluate the e¤ect on the respondents income. Including the 15TK daily
stipend that comes with the asset transfer, income increases by 2,800TK, which amounts to dou-
bling the baseline. Without the stipend, however, income falls by 700TK. Further analysis which
is not reported for reasons of space indicate that this is driven by a loss of earnings from maid
work and daily laboring. This is in line with the expectations of the programme, as assets cannot
generate much income in the short run, and this was the rationale for paying the stipend. We
note that the stipend however more than compensates for the loss of earnings as income including
stipend is signicantly higher for treated ultra-poor households.
Table 5 illustrates what the extra income is used for. Column 1 shows a 10% increase in
per capita expenditure, but this is not signicant at conventional levels. Further results (not
shown) indicate that this is driven by an increase in non-food expenditures per capita, while food
expenditures experience a slight decline. Consumption analysis of individual food items reveal
some increase in meat and egg consumption, but none of these e¤ects are precisely estimated.
The next columns show that the programme lead to an increase in household durables, driven
by purchases of radios and bicycles. Further analysis (not shown) does not nd a signicant e¤ect
on any other non-food expenditures or investments such as house repairs.
Table 6 evaluates the e¤ect of the programme on human capital outcomes. The rst two
columns show the e¤ects on the respondent BMI (1.07, corresponding to a 2.2 kg increase for
the average height) and on children z-scores (.72). While neither is precisely estimated, both
are very large in magnitude. To put the BMI numbers in context, 1.07 is between the di¤erence
between ultra-poor and class 4 (1) and between ultra-poor and class 3 (1.2) at baseline. This is not
necessarily inconsistent with the fact that food expenditure and calorie composition is unchanged,
as measurement error in these variables is notoriously severe.
Columns 3 and 4 analyze the impact of the programme on self-assessed entrepreneurship skills.
The survey collects information on a rich set of twelve business skills, ranging, e.g. from the ability
to identify a promising business opportunity, to keeping books and managing employees.
For parsimony we group the twelve business skills into two categories according to whether they
require third party interactions (e.g. keeping books versus dealing with clients). The rationale
behind this is that the ultra-poor are likely to have more control over their own learning abilities
(e.g. to keep books) than over outcomes that depend on the perception that others have of
them. The estimates indicate that the programme signicantly increases the individual measure
13
of business skills by 20% but its impact on the peoples measure is just below half the size and
not precisely estimated. This is consistent with the fact that the ultra-poor status in society and
that a¤ects their ability to deal with third parties might change at a slower pace than their asset
holding and occupational choices.
Overall, the ndings indicate that the programme leads to radical changes in the economic lives
of ultra-poor households, as their asset level and occupational choices come to resemble those of
the lower-middle classes. By revealed preference, household durables were the items the ultra-poor
felt more constrained on, as those are the only purchases for which we can measure a signicant
increase. We also see a signicant increase in business skills, which is encouraging for the long-term
sustainability of the programme.
4.2 Programme E¤ect on the Structure of Networks
This section investigates whether the radical changes in ultra-poor circumstances brought about
by the programme a¤ect the type of transactions that take place within their network, or the
composition of the network per se. As described earlier, we group information on all transactions
between ultra-poor and other households in the spot into two broad networks. The market network
includes market transactions in employment, credit and land rental. We dene household j to be in
the market network of a ultra-poor if j either employs (or in principle is employed by) a ultra-poor,
lends or borrows from a ultra-poor or lets or rents land to a ultra-poor The informal insurance
network includes all non market transfers, monetary or in-kind, that are not explicitly payment for
services or other goods. We dene household j to be in the insurance network of a ultra-poor if j
exchanges (borrow/lend) food items, provides assistance in times of crisis or transfers in cash/kind
with a ultra-poor household. Finally, we also study family networks, i.e. networks whose members
are linked through family relations, even they never engage in market or non-market transactions.
This section investigates whether the programme leads ultra-poor to change the members of
their market and insurance networks (by denition, family cannot change other than for reasons
exogenous to the programme such as migration or marriage).10 This is the rst step of a research
agenda that aims to exploit the exogenous changes brought by the programme to shed light on
how networks react to changes in the wealth of their members and the implications that this has
for our understanding of the functions of di¤erent networks.
To evaluate the e¤ect of the programme on the composition of the ultra-poor networks we test
whether the programme made the ultra-poor drop existing members and/or add new ones. Our
baseline specications are:
mj1 = 
1 + 1Tj + 
1Xj + j if mj0 = 1 (3)
mj1 = 
2 + 2Tj + 
2Xj + j if mj0 = 0
where mj1 = 1 (mj0 = 1) if household j is connected to a ultra-poor after (before) the programme,
10Reassuringly, we nd that the programme has no e¤ect on the composition of the family networks.
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0 otherwise. We estimate (3) separately for market and insurance networks. The rst equation
in (3) estimates the probability that household j remains connected to a ultra-poor after the
programme, whereas the second estimates the probability that household j becomes connected to
a ultra-poor after the programme. The parameters of interest are 1 and 2;which measure the
di¤erence between treatment and control. 1 > 0 (2 > 0) indicates the average household is
more likely to remain connected (to join) at least one ultra-poor in spots where the programme is
active.
We also investigate whether the e¤ect of the programme depends on the social class of j;by
interacting the Tj term in (3) with class dummies. This allows us to establish whether the ultra-
poor substitute network members across wealth classes as they become wealthier.
Table 7 reports the estimates of (3) with and without the interactions with class dummies, for
the market and insurance networks. The table reports the average e¤ect of the programme on all
classes in Columns 1-2 and 5-6 and the average e¤ect by wealth class in Columns 3-4 and 7-8.
Columns 1 and 2 show that the programme has no signicant impact on the composition of the
market network. Both 1 and 2are not signicantly di¤erent from zero, although the estimate of
1 is large, indicating that households in treated spots are neither more nor less likely to remain
connected or join a ultra-poor network after the programme. Columns 3 and 4 show that the
average e¤ect hides heterogeneous e¤ects by wealth class. In particular we nd that households in
class 4 are signicantly less likely to remain connected to ultra-poor after the programme, whereas
upper class households are signicantly more likely to remain connected. In line with this, Column
4 shows that upper class households are signicantly more likely to join a ultra-poor network after
the programme.
Columns 5 and 6 indicate that 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 for informal insurance networks, although
only 2 is precisely estimated, indicating that this network becomes larger after the programme.
Columns 7 and 8 show that the expansion is accompanied by a change in composition by social
class. In particular, Column 7 shows that ultra-poor households are signicantly less likely to
remain connected to other ultra-poor households, whereas households belonging to class 3 are
more likely to remain connected. Column 8 then shows that other ultra-poor households and
households from class 5 and 4 are more likely to join.
Taken together these ndings indicate that the programme has a signicant impact on the
composition of the ultra-poor network. In particular, the programme seems to create connections
between ultra-poor and households in higher wealth classes, especially for market transactions.
The programme is thus e¤ective in giving the ultra-poor a chance to interact with individuals of
higher social status, thus reducing opening up possibilities for better integration in society.
4.3 Programme E¤ect on Households With and Without an Ultra-
poor Connection
The dramatic change in the lives of the ultra-poor is likely to a¤ect households that are connected
to them through various networks. To investigate this hypothesis this section evaluates the e¤ect
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of the programme on the outcomes of non-ultra-poor households that are connected to at least
one ultra-poor household, and compares them to households that have no connection to the ultra-
poor. To purge the estimates from changes due to changes in network compositions we restrict
the sample to households that are connected (not connected) to ultra-poor both at baseline and
follow-up. We also restrict the analysis to family and insurance networks, as only 13 households
have market connections to ultra-poor before and after the programme.
Tables 8 to 16 evaluate the e¤ect of the programme on households linked to ultra-poor through
family connections, through insurance networks and not connected. We follow the same method-
ology, use the same specication and same outcome variables as in Section 4.1 above.
Five ndings are of note. First, neither connected nor unconnected households experience an
increase in the outcomes directly a¤ected by the programme business assets and savings. This
is reassuring as it suggests that the increase experienced by the ultra-poor are purely due to the
programme, namely there are no di¤erential trends between the treatment and control branches
that could explain part of the di¤erence.
Second, the programme a¤ects the time use of connected households: both family and members
of the insurance networks increase the time devoted to household chores at the expense of leisure,
and the magnitude of the e¤ect is comparable to the same e¤ect for the ultra-poor about 400
hours per year. This is not due to common trends at the branch level, as unconnected households
are una¤ected, and it deserves further investigation.
Third, households who are connected to at least one ultra-poor through family links experience
a signicant and large increase in per capita expenditure, which raises by 30% of the baseline
amount. This comes entirely from non-food expenditure and is also mirrored by an increase in
household durables, in particular bicycles and beds. Human capital variables are una¤ected.
Fourth, the increase in per capita expenditure for households belonging to the insurance net-
work is smaller (18% of the baseline amount) and not precisely estimated. We observe no signicant
change in household durables or any other item. There is however a signicant increase in self
reported business skills, by roughly half the comparable magnitude for the ultra-poor (.18 vs. .40).
Further analysis (not shown here) indicates that the e¤ect for members of the insurance network
who are not family members is even closer to the e¤ect on the treated (.27 vs. .40).
Fifth, the programme has no discernible impact on the outcomes of non connected households,
e¤ectively ruling out the hypothesis that the ndings for connected households are driven by
common trends that di¤er between the treatment and control branch.
Taken together the ndings indicate that the large wealth shock experienced by ultra-poor
households benets the members of their family network, whose consumption expenditure and
durables increase, and the members of their informal insurance network, who experience an increase
in business skills. The di¤erence between the two networks is consistent with them having di¤erent
functions, so that family networks engage in wealth redistribution, and hence are a¤ected by a
permanent increase in the wealth of one of their members, whereas insurance networks only smooth
temporary income shocks and are therefore una¤ected by permanent increases in wealth.
We note that the e¤ect on family members can be driven both by a direct transfer from the
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ultra-poor and by a reduction in current and expected future transfers to ultra-poor , implying
that family members disposable income increases. The reduction in current and expected future
transfers must play a key role because the increase in consumption expenditure is stronger for
family members than for the ultra-poor themselves.
The fact that the programme a¤ects the business skills of members of the insurance network
but not of those of the family network might be driven by the fact that insurance networks are
endogenously chosen, possibly among people with similar interests, who can benet from learning
business skills from the ultra-poor. Members of family networks, on the other hand, need not have
similar interests, so that they might not benet and hence have no incentive learn how to run a
business from the treated ultra-poor.
While our results are consistent with this assumption on the di¤erent roles of di¤erent networks,
they are far from providing denitive evidence. A parallel project is fully dedicated to explore
these issues in detail.
5 Conclusions
Combining a randomized evaluation strategy with a survey of all households in treatment and
control locations, we provide evidence on the e¤ect of a programme which attempts to promote
basic entrepreneuship amongst the poorest women in Bangladesh. We examine the e¤ects of
programme both on targeted beneciaries and within the social networks to which they belong.
We show that the programme transforms the economic lives of the beneciaries, the composition
of their social network, and selected outcomes of network members. The key contribution of this
paper is to show that the e¤ect of the programme extends beyond the private sphere, and spills
over into the social networks of the beneciaries. Three ndings are of particular note.
First, we show that network composition changes, and as they become wealthier, beneciaries
establish connections with households in higher wealth classes. Using an exogenous shock the
programme we are thus able to shed light the causal e¤ect of wealth di¤erences on network
membership.
Second, and in contrast to earlier work on programme spillovers, we show that the distinction
between households that are socially connected to the beneciaries and those who are not is crucial,
as only the former are a¤ected by the programme.
Third, our detailed information on social interactions on a wide range of domains allows us to
show that spillovers are heterogeneous by network type, and the evidence indicates that family
networks share wealth, whereas informal insurance networks share information on business skills.
Ultimately, however, both the estimated private and social e¤ects are measured within a single
year, and thus might over- or under- estimate the long run e¤ects. For instance, beneciaries
consumption and human capital might grow faster once they reach the peak of the learning curve,
so that our estimates may be smaller than the long-run e¤ects. On the other hand, changes in
network composition might just reect short-run experiments, which might be undone in the long
17
run. Future survey rounds will provide the data to answer these important questions.
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Panel A: Naogaon
Panel B: Treatment and Control Spots
Panel A Notes: Naogaon is a district located in North-west Bangladesh
Map 1: Map of the Study Area
Panel B Notes: The map shows the location of treatment and control spots within Naogaon district. The black clusters represent 
the clusters of treatment housheolds that make up the treatment spots. The red clusters represent the control spots.
Panel A - Baseline Descriptive Statistics by Wealth Class
STUPs other WR 5 WR 4 WR 3 WR 2 WR 1
186 371 602 392 307 301
8.6% 17.2% 27.9% 18.2% 14.2% 13.9%
.55 .85 .97 .96 .98 .98
(.50) (.36) (.18) (.19) (.14) (.14)
3.05 3.44 3.81 4.03 4.14 4.78
(1.72) (1.31) (1.25) (1.31) (1.42) (2.01)
.09 .26 .29 .38 .45 .55
(.28) (.44) (.46) (.49) (.50) (.50)
18.60 19.43 19.70 19.86 20.42 20.92
(2.90) (2.72) (2.94) (3.10) (3.30) (3.31)
6134.4 6895.5 7696.9 10093.8 13111.3 24517.6
(3438.0) (4240.0) (5064.2) (8442.9) (11959.8) (78347.3)
328.7 818.8 1021.8 1460.7 2221.5 5690.6
(424.3) (2589.9) (1243.3) (2000.6) (2738.3) (11876.3)
4327.9 20711.4 42125.7 176843.5 390901.9 1196752
(21460.8) (130769.8) (102413.9) (357345.5) (547774.4) (2093045)
169.7 487.8 773.5 1617.4 1307.3 12945.9
(782.4) (1459.9) (1558.0) (8652.0) (3472.0) (73930.2)
2.33   2.47 2.53 2.53 2.44 2.44
 (.58) (.58) (.57) (.54) (.62) (.63)
2.59 2.63 2.66 2.65 2.64 2.55
(.45) (.50) (.47) (.46) (.50) (.52)
Panel B - Time Allocation of the Respondents at Baseline
STUPs other WR 5 WR 4 WR 3 WR 2 WR 1
382.63 616.72 751.90 815.29 850.51 847.41
(433.91) (534.53) (440.66) (429.98) 390.73 (377.99)
331.77 156.20 112.91 94.06 31.86 4.05
(562.49) (460.28) (349.00) (312.76) (169.14) (52.01)
449.65 126.58 39.10 9.59 5.54 1.99
(747.33) (428.99) (226.20) 135.60 (60.52) (34.58)
1203.07 1439.96 1505.94 1499.68 1539.12 1565.25
(493.81) (525.38) (471.21) (459.78) (435.24) (480.00)
6327.67 6412.08 6330.11 6310.09 6299.37 6319.93
701.52 (759.46) (684.68) (671.78) (644.80) (683.64)
N 186 371 602 392 307 301
Panel B Notes:Total hours that the main female in the household spent during the previous year given by type of activity.
Entrepreneurship I is the mean for the responses to 6 questions about respondent's self-confidence in her entrepreneurial tasks. The responses can be 
1=I definitely cannot do this task, 2=May be I can do this task, 3=I definitely can do this task. The tasks are to run your own business, to identify 
business opportunities to start up new business, to identify business opportunities to expand existing business, to save in order to invest in future 
business opportunities, to manage financial accounts, to estimates acccurately the costs of running a new business. Entrepreneurship II is the mean 
for the responses to 6 taks about responsent's self-confidence in her entrepreneurial skills, for tasks involving her interaction with others. The tasks 
are to bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are buying inputs for your business, to bargain to obtain high prices for your outputs, to protect your 
business from harm by others, to collect money someone owes you, to make sure employees get the work done properly, to obtian credit to start up 
new business ot to expand existing business.
Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics
Maid Hours
Household-chore Hours 
Leisure Hours
Panel A Notes: The sample includes all HHs and observations form baseline survey only. Total Pce, HH Durables Value, Business Assets' Value 
and Savings are given in Bangladeshi TAKAs. Total Pce includes value of food (calculated from last 3 days' consumption) and non-food items 
consumed in the HH. HH Durables include radio, bicycle, chair, table, chouki (bed), bednet. Business assets include land, livestock, power pump, 
plough, tractor, mowing machine, shed to keep livestock, shop premises, boat, fishnet, rickshaw/van, trees, cart. 
Class Size
HH Head Male
Husbandry Hours
Day-Labor Hours
HH Size
Savings
Entrepreneurship I
Literacy
Entrepreneurship II
Total Pce
BMI of respondent
HH Durables Value
Business Assets' Value
Notes: Kdensity of the natural logarithm of total wealth (log wealth) is presented. Figure 1(a) shows the distribution of log wealth in 
treatment spots. The blue curve represents the wealth distribution at baseline and the red curve represents the wealth distribution at 
follow-up survey. The red straight line on the left shows the mean level for the log wealth of STUPs in treatment spots at baseline 
(6.234) and the red line on the right represents the mean level for log wealth of STUPs in treatment spots at followup (9.573). Figure 1(b) 
shows the distribution of log wealth in control spots. The blue curve represents the wealth distribution in control spots at baseline and the 
red curve represents the wealth distribution at follow-up survey. The red straight line on the left shows the mean level for the log wealth 
of STUPs in control spots at baseline (6.863) and the red line on the right represents the mean level for log wealth of STUPs at followup 
(7.557). 
Figure 1: Wealth Distribution
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Fig 1(a): Log Wealth in Treatment Branch
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Fig 1(b): Log Wealth in Control Branch
other WR 5 WR 4 WR 3 WR 2
At baseline 1.380*** 2.706*** 3.990*** 5.148***
(.253) (.231) (.241) (.240)
At follow-up -1.518*** -.555*** .753*** 1.842***
(.171) (.128) (.150) (.152)
Simple Diff -2.897*** -3.261*** -3.238*** -3.305***
(.292) (.253) (.268) (.267)
Diff-in-Diff -2.546*** -2.895*** -2.952*** -2.904***
(.504) (.470) (.504) (.491)
Family 
Network
Market 
Network
Informal 
Insurance 
Network
Transfers to 
STUP
Receives 
Transfer from 
STUP
N
Everyone .151 .024 .246 .217 .165 2159
(.358) (.152) (.431) (.458) (.371)
Among STUPs .220 0 .382 .296 .317 186
(.416) 0 (.487) (.458) (.467)
Other WR5 .200 .005 .286 .240 .210 371
(.400) (.073) (.452) (.428) (.408)
WR4 .191 .007 .232 .241 .198 602
(.393) (.081) (.423) (.428) (.399)
WR3 .128 .013 .232 .217 .133 392
(.334) (.114) (.423) (.413) (.340)
WR2 .117 .013 .182 .170 .101 307
(.322) (.114) (.387) (.376) (.302)
WR1 .033 .120 .166 .143 .057 301
(.180) (.325) (.373) (.351) (.231)
Table 2: Differences in log wealth between STUPs and others
Table 3: Proportion of HHs Connected to STUPs at Baseline
(.480)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Total Sample Size is 4318. Wealth is measured in Bangladeshi 
TAKAs and it consists of the total of business assets (land, livestock, power pump, plough, tractor, mowing machine, shed for 
keeping livestock, shop premises, boat, fishnet, rickshaw/van, trees, cart), household assets (radio, television, electric fan, refrigrator, 
cellular phone, bicycle, motorcycle, sewing machine, chair, table, chouki(bed), sofa, bednet, jewelry, ceremonial sarees for women) 
and savings. 
Notes: The sample includes observations from baseline only. The proportions for households  who are in the social network of STUP 
households at baseline are given by wealth classes. The first column gives the proportion of households who are in the first degree 
family (parents, spouse, spouse's parents, children, siblings and spouse's siblings) of the STUPs and who live in the same spot as the 
STUPs. The second column gives the proportion of households who are in the economic network of the STUPs (those who employ, 
rent out land and/or livestock, lend money to STUPs). The third column gives the proportion of households that engage in informal 
insurance transactions with the stups (these include food exchange, assistance in times of crisis, and any other transfers in cash/kind). 
The fourth and the fifth column are a breakdown of the informal insurance network. Column 4 gives the proportion of households that 
transfer in cash/kind to a STUP household. Column 5 gives proportion of households that receive transfer(s) in cash/kind from a 
STUP household.
WR 1
6.144***
(.244)
2.751***
(.155)
-3.394***
(.269)
-3.089***
Table 4: Direct Effects of the Programme I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Assets Saving Husbandry Day-labor Maid Chores Leisure Income I Income II
treat -8798.1 271.1 -245.8** 811.8 939.9** -508.2*** 208.1 2274.2** 2358.8**
(6496.8) (270.7) (121.1) (524.2) (409.8) (96.0) (142.1) (922.6) (913.2)
repeat 6076.6 780.8** -24.1 536.5 443.8 -431.0*** 232.8 2313.0* 2320.3*
(10109.5) (333.6) (129.6) (609.1) (478.3) (116.0) (156.7) (1316.8) (1306.4)
treat*repeat 22446.1** 1109.2*** 559.8*** -441.0 -1100.2** 427.0*** -423.9** 2776.5* -696.1
(9921.6) (352.9) (138.3) (618.3) (504.3) (122.1) (169.8) (1473.3) (1459.7)
N 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372
baseline 1196.4 127.4 519.9 27.7 293.8 1516.3 6334.3 2751.3 2751.3
(2257.4) (401.8) (522.7) (172.9) (660.4) (442.5) (639.8) (3897.7) (3897.7)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the STUP households at baseline and followup. Treat is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for whether the observation is from the
followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the total value of business assets (in TAKAs). In Column 2 the
dependent variable is total value of savings (in TAKAs) of the household. In Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variables
are the hours spent by the main female in the household during the past year working in animal husbandry, working in daily
labor, working as a maid and on household chores respectively. In Column 7 the dependent variable is the hours spent not
working on any business activity or household chores by the main female in the household during the past year. In Column 8
the dependent variable is the total household income (in TAKAs) from the business activities of the main female respondent
during the past year, including the stipend that the treated STUPs received from BRAC. In Column 9 the dependent variable
is the total household income (in TAKAs) from the business activities of the main female respondent during the past year,
excluding the stipend.
Table 5: Direct Effects of the Programme II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pce Durables Value Radios Bicycles Chairs Tables Beds Bednets
treat 703.03 -94.56 0.00 -0.00 0.12 0.01 -0.17 -0.11
(790.01) (104.53) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
repeat -686.33 72.43 0.01 -0.02 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.26*
(773.46) (110.64) (0.03) (0.01) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15)
treat*repeat 550.37 113.09 0.08** 0.05** -0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(897.89) (127.24) (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16)
N 290 372 372 372 372 372 372 372
baseline 5662.76 464.72 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.74 0.85
(3307.25) (420.05) (0.16) (0.00) (0.38) (0.31) (0.50) (0.54)
OLS Tobit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the STUP households at baseline and followup. Treat is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for
whether the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the value
(in TAKAs) of the per capita food and non-food consumption of the household during the past year.
In Column 2 the dependent variable is the total value of household durables (radios, bicycles, chairs,
tables, beds and bednets) owned by the household, in TAKAs.In Columns 3-8, the dependent variables
are respectively the number of radios, bicycles, chairs, tables, beds and bednets that the household owns.
Table 6: Direct Effects of the Programme III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Respondent’s BMI Z value for wfl Entrepreneurship I Entrepreneurship II
treat -1.209 -0.984** -0.210* -0.022
(0.791) (0.387) (0.123) (0.112)
repeat -1.054 -0.781* -0.507*** -0.405**
(0.907) (0.447) (0.162) (0.163)
treat*repeat 1.070 0.718 0.402** 0.183
(0.944) (0.504) (0.166) (0.167)
N 328 140 346 346
baseline 19.610 -0.722 2.198 2.443
(3.859) (0.937) (0.625) (0.562)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Respondent Kids Respondent Respondent
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the STUP households at baseline and followup. Treat
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable
for whether the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is
the BMI of the respondent. In Column 2 the dependent variable is the z-score for the weight-for-
length of the children aged 1-5 years old. In Column 3 the dependent variable is the mean for
the responses to 6 questions about respondent’s self-confidence in her entrepreneurial skills. The
responses can be 1=I definitely cannot do this task, 2=May be I can do this task, 3=I definitely
can do this task. The tasks are to run your own business, to identify business opportunities to start
up new business, to identify business opportunities to expand existing business, to save in order to
invest in future business opportunities, to manage financial accounts, to estimate accurately the
costs of running a new business. In Column 4 the dependent variables is the mean for the responses
to 6 questions about respondent’s self-confidence in her entrepreneurial skills. The responses can
be as before. The tasks are to bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are buying anything for
business, to bargain to obtain high prices for your outputs, to protect your business assets from
harm by others, to collect the money someone owns you, to make sure employees get the work
done properly, to obtain credit to start up new business or expand existing business.
Table 7: Direct Effects on The Composition of STUP’s Networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market Market Market Market Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance
treat 0.147 0.006 0.024 -0.005 0.041 0.040*** -0.203*** 0.261***
(0.145) (0.008) (0.371) (0.010) (0.044) (0.014) (0.071) (0.051)
WR5 -0.042 0.002 0.032 0.092***
(0.176) (0.013) (0.082) (0.030)
WR4 -0.764*** -0.009 -0.042 0.059**
(0.195) (0.010) (0.066) (0.025)
WR3 0.188 0.029 0.216* -0.038
(0.325) (0.019) (0.123) (0.037)
WR2 0.024 0.012 -0.027 0.012
(0.371) (0.023) (0.117) (0.036)
WR1 0.384*** 0.078** 0.086 -0.048
(0.125) (0.039) (0.138) (0.032)
N 54 2105 54 2105 532 1627 532 1627
Baseline Connected YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is connected to a
STUP household at followup through the market network (columns 1-4) or through the informal insurance network
(columns 5-8). The row ”Baseline Connected” indicates whether the sample consists of households that are connected
to STUPs at baseline or those who are not connected to STUPs at baseline through the relevant network. Treat is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. In columns 3-4 and 7-8 the regression includes
interaction of the treat dummy with wealth classes. The reference category is STUP. The rows WR5-WR1 report
the sum of the coefficient of treat with the interaction of treat and the relevant wealth class dummy variable and the
standard error of this sum.
Table 8: Indirect Effects on the Family Network of STUPs I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Assets Saving Husbandry Day-labor Maid Chores Leisure Income I
treat -45518.2 1163.2 -268.7*** 209.9 698.9 -374.5*** 415.4*** 1135.9
(51946.5) (1746.7) (72.3) (364.8) (714.7) (66.9) (97.1) (854.9)
repeat 1724.7 10568.5 -189.6** -345.5 462.6 -333.7*** 466.3*** 3335.5**
(69901.8) (6985.4) (80.4) (436.2) (764.2) (81.0) (116.6) (1384.3)
treatXrepeat -19811.0 -11880.5 140.7 262.5 -566.9 405.2*** -455.9*** -9.7
(81046.7) (8256.2) (89.5) (460.4) (809.0) (88.4) (132.6) (1781.6)
N 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570
baseline 87513.1 914.8 921.5 50.4 63.7 1638.8 6087.7 2706.8
(251520.5) (3136.5) (481.8) (275.5) (276.3) (469.8) (682.6) (5063.9)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are in the first degree family of STUPs and live in the
same spot. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for
whether the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the total value of business assets
(in TAKAs). In Column 2 the dependent variable is total value of savings (in TAKAs) of the household. In Columns 3,
4, 5 and 6 the dependent variables are the hours spent by the main female in the household during the past year working
in animal husbandry, working in daily labor, working as a maid and on household chores respectively. In Column 7 the
dependent variable is the hours spent not working on any business activity or household chores by the main female in the
household during the past year. In Column 8 the dependent variable is the total household income (in TAKAs) from the
business activities of the main female respondent during the past year.
Table 9: Indirect Effects on the Family Network of STUPs II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pce Durables Value Radios Bicycles Chairs Tables Beds Bednets
treat -2226.04* -1033.82*** -0.01 -0.05 -0.22 -0.27*** -0.51*** -0.24*
(1214.63) (396.92) (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
repeat -3537.80*** 565.13 -0.06 -0.04 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.05
(1265.45) (557.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
treatXrepeat 2907.08** 26.16 0.06 0.16** 0.12 0.17 0.29* 0.19
(1359.31) (609.96) (0.07) (0.08) (0.21) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16)
N 498 570 570 570 570 570 570 570
baseline 9726.09 1551.91 0.11 0.16 1.01 0.70 1.36 1.40
(9436.98) (3539.23) (0.32) (0.40) (1.33) (0.89) (1.44) (1.04)
OLS Tobit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the STUP households at baseline and followup. Treat is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for
whether the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the value
(in TAKAs) of the per capita food and non-food consumption of the household during the past year.
In Column 2 the dependent variable is the total value of household durables (radios, bicycles, chairs,
tables, beds and bednets) owned by the household, in TAKAs.In Columns 3-8, the dependent variables
are respectively the number of radios, bicycles, chairs, tables, beds and bednets that the household owns.
Table 10: Indirect Effects on the Family Network of STUPs III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Respondent’s BMI Z value for wfl Entrepreneurship I Entrepreneurship II
treat -0.358 0.338 -0.149* -0.086
(0.366) (0.356) (0.084) (0.075)
repeat 0.012 0.294 -0.366*** -0.321***
(0.430) (0.377) (0.111) (0.100)
treatXrepeat 0.153 -0.533 0.129 0.059
(0.503) (0.423) (0.122) (0.111)
N 502 230 550 550
baseline 19.848 -1.498 2.339 2.488
(2.592) (1.719) (0.646) (0.587)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Respondent Kids Respondent Respondent
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the STUP households at baseline and followup.
Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy
variable for whether the observation is from the followup survey. For the explanation of the
dependent variables, see notes for Table 6.
Table 11: Indirect Effects on the Informal Insurance Network of STUPs I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Assets Saving Husbandry Day-labor Maid Chores Leisure Income I
treat 16268.7 2482.3 -175.8*** 633.3 -314.0 -287.3*** 316.5*** -74.1
(73525.6) (1575.4) (63.3) (421.0) (632.0) (62.1) (84.1) (1734.9)
repeat -25168.4 7351.1 -119.7* 308.7 -739.4 -253.7*** 371.8*** 2597.3
(92324.6) (4938.0) (71.3) (458.4) (777.4) (79.9) (105.4) (2206.4)
treatXrepeat -27025.0 -7380.0 67.5 -347.2 455.9 363.3*** -395.1*** 166.5
(101078.4) (5741.7) (78.7) (461.9) (836.5) (84.8) (116.8) (2223.0)
N 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746
baseline 173781.5 1235.4 874.8 36.7 55.4 1620.5 6171.7 4241.0
(529741.7) (3144.1) (445.9) (216.2) (235.2) (474.6) (636.6) (13005.5)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are in the informal insurance network of STUPs and
live in the same spot. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy
variable for whether the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the total value of
business assets (in TAKAs). In Column 2 the dependent variable is total value of savings (in TAKAs) of the household. In
Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variables are the hours spent by the main female in the household during the past year
working in animal husbandry, working in daily labor, working as a maid and on household chores respectively. In Column 7
the dependent variable is the hours spent not working on any business activity or household chores by the main female in
the household during the past year. In Column 8 the dependent variable is the total household income (in TAKAs) from the
business activities of the main female respondent during the past year.
Table 12: Indirect Effects on the Informal Insurance Network of STUPs II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pce Durables Value Radios Bicycles Chairs Tables Beds Bednets
treat -2868.71 -973.73** 0.10** -0.08 -0.10 -0.20** -0.41*** -0.26**
(2118.41) (380.92) (0.04) (0.05) (0.15) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
repeat -4491.24* 1009.25* -0.01 0.03 0.54** 0.16 0.26* 0.13
(2394.09) (573.25) (0.05) (0.07) (0.23) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14)
treatXrepeat 2252.04 -500.60 -0.01 0.03 -0.33 -0.05 -0.14 0.06
(2418.05) (636.26) (0.06) (0.08) (0.26) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16)
N 660 746 746 746 746 746 746 746
baseline 12690.67 2255.55 0.09 0.26 1.20 0.80 1.57 1.59
(23959.07) (4971.26) (0.29) (0.48) (1.52) (0.92) (1.42) (1.26)
OLS Tobit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are in the informal insurance network
of STUPs and live in the same spot. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a
treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for whether the observation is from the followup survey.
In Column 1 the dependent variable is the value (in TAKAs) of the per capita food and non-food
consumption of the household during the past year. In Column 2 the dependent variable is the total
value of household durables (radios, bicycles, chairs, tables, beds and bednets) owned by the household,
in TAKAs.In Columns 3-8, the dependent variables are respectively the number of radios, bicycles, chairs,
tables, beds and bednets that the household owns.
Table 13: Indirect Effects on the Informal Insurance Network of STUPs III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Respondent’s BMI Z value for wfl Entrepreneurship I Entrepreneurship II
treat -0.621 0.338 -0.138* -0.062
(0.386) (0.353) (0.077) (0.067)
repeat -0.058 0.243 -0.399*** -0.354***
(0.474) (0.361) (0.101) (0.092)
treatXrepeat 0.107 -0.645 0.198* 0.121
(0.533) (0.409) (0.109) (0.100)
N 660 280 720 720
baseline 20.327 -1.474 2.345 2.502
(3.373) (1.799) (0.651) (0.585)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Respondent Kids Respondent Respondent
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are in the informal insurance
network of STUPs and live in the same spot. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household
is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for whether the observation is from the followup
survey. For explanation of the dependent variables, see notes for Table 6.
Table 14: Indirect Effects on Those not Connected to STUPs I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Assets Saving Husbandry Day-labor Maid Chores Leisure Income I
treat 51596.7 3782.4** -82.4*** -114.3 -567.4* -117.7*** 191.0*** 545.6
(40510.3) (1810.7) (29.0) (174.2) (310.4) (27.3) (40.3) (644.0)
repeat 18392.3 6153.8*** -30.3 203.2 -343.9 -72.4** 62.7 4316.8***
(39948.8) (1856.1) (32.9) (190.9) (334.1) (32.9) (47.8) (789.8)
treatXrepeat -79844.5 -8201.3*** -22.5 -92.1 389.7 65.8* -27.8 -2050.7
(58965.5) (3029.0) (40.3) (238.7) (424.3) (38.7) (57.2) (1294.1)
N 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426
baseline 225599.8 1524.5 827.6 20.1 38.1 1606.2 6263.7 4120.6
(498900.8) (7398.2) (468.5) (140.4) (221.1) (466.0) (692.1) (7473.3)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are not connected STUPs and live in the same spot.
Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for whether
the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the total value of business assets (in
TAKAs). In Column 2 the dependent variable is total value of savings (in TAKAs) of the household. In Columns 3, 4, 5 and
6 the dependent variables are the hours spent by the main female in the household during the past year working in animal
husbandry, working in daily labor, working as a maid and on household chores respectively. In Column 7 the dependent
variable is the hours spent not working on any business activity or household chores by the main female in the household
during the past year. In Column 8 the dependent variable is the total household income (in TAKAs) from the business
activities of the main female respondent during the past year.
Table 15: Indirect Effects on Those not Connected to STUPs II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pce Durables Value Radios Bicycles Chairs Tables Beds Bednets
treat -2347.75 -396.71 0.01 -0.05** 0.05 -0.15*** -0.40*** -0.16***
(2872.93) (295.81) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
repeat -4690.54 807.18** -0.00 0.05* 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.12**
(2885.80) (326.97) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
treatXrepeat 1562.79 -852.66** 0.01 0.06* -0.22* -0.05 -0.09 -0.07
(2803.85) (415.82) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
N 2210 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426 2426
baseline 13294.05 2263.42 0.17 0.26 1.44 0.88 1.75 1.69
(59485.74) (4033.74) (0.37) (0.48) (1.74) (0.89) (1.20) (1.02)
OLS Tobit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are not connected to STUPs and live
in the same spot. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment spot. Repeat is
a dummy variable for whether the observation is from the followup survey. In Column 1 the dependent
variable is the value (in TAKAs) of the per capita food and non-food consumption of the household
during the past year. In Column 2 the dependent variable is the total value of household durables
(radios, bicycles, chairs, tables, beds and bednets) owned by the household, in TAKAs.In Columns 3-8,
the dependent variables are respectively the number of radios, bicycles, chairs, tables, beds and bednets
that the household owns.
Table 16: Indirect Effects on Those not Connected to STUPs III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Respondent’s BMI Z value for wfl Entrepreneurship I Entrepreneurship II
treat -0.562*** -0.356* 0.023 -0.026
(0.184) (0.182) (0.035) (0.030)
repeat -0.059 -0.280 -0.382*** -0.335***
(0.205) (0.181) (0.043) (0.039)
treatXrepeat 0.283 0.170 0.032 0.068
(0.262) (0.210) (0.051) (0.046)
N 2214 968 2356 2356
baseline 20.506 -0.852 2.348 2.506
(3.091) (2.223) (0.653) (0.575)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Respondent Kids Respondent Respondent
*** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. The sample includes the households who are not connected to STUPs
and live in the same spot. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in a treatment
spot. Repeat is a dummy variable for whether the observation is from the followup survey. For
explanation of the dependent variables, see notes for Table 6.
Appendix
Panel A - Baseline Descriptive Statistics
Panel B - Time Allocation of the Respondents at Baseline
N
Panel B Notes:Total hours that the main female in the household spent during the previous year given by type of activity.
Entrepreneurship I is the mean for the responses to 6 questions about respondent's self-confidence in her entrepreneurial tasks. The 
responses can be 1=I definitely cannot do this task, 2=May be I can do this task, 3=I definitely can do this task. The tasks are to run 
your own business, to identify business opportunities to start up new business, to identify business opportunities to expand existing 
business, to save in order to invest in future business opportunities, to manage financial accounts, to estimates acccurately the costs of 
running a new business. Entrepreneurship II is the mean for the responses to 6 taks about responsent's self-confidence in her 
entrepreneurial skills, for tasks involving her interaction with others. The tasks are to bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are 
buying inputs for your business, to bargain to obtain high prices for your outputs, to protect your business from harm by others, to 
collect money someone owes you, to make sure employees get the work done properly, to obtian credit to start up new business ot to 
expand existing business.
147 39
Panel A Notes: The sample includes STUPs and observations from baseline survey only. Total Pce, HH Durables Value, Business 
Assets' Value and Savings are given in Bangladeshi TAKAs. Total Pce includes value of food (calculated from last 3 days' 
consumption) and non-food items consumed in the HH. HH Durables include radio, bicycle, chair, table, chouki (bed), bednet. 
Business assets include land, livestock, power pump, plough, tractor, mowing machine, shed to keep livestock, shop premises, boat, 
fishnet, rickshaw/van, trees, cart. 
(59.31) (102.44) (126.70)
Leisure Hours 6325.91 6334.31 8.40
Household-chore Hours 1119.97 1516.28 396.31***
(39.11) (70.86) (84.27)
Maid Hours 490.99 293.85 -197.14
(63.14) (105.75) (134.19)
Day-Labor Hours 412.45 27.70 -384.76***
(49.62) (27.70) (97.55)
Treatment Control Difference
Husbandry Hours 346.22 519.87 173.65**
(33.11) (83.70) (77.32)
Entrepreneurship II 2.58 2.60 .02
(.04) (.10) (.09)
Entrepreneurship I 2.27 2.55 .29***
(.05) (.10) (.11)
Savings 180.95 127.44 -53.52
(70.61) (64.34) (141.25)
Business Assets' Value 5158.71 1196.41 -3962.30
(1984.56) (361.47) (3865.02)
HH Durables Value 292.59 464.72 172.13**
(34.60) (67.26) (75.58)
Total Pce 6179.40 5955.76 -223.64
(308.95) (634.95) (692.97)
BMI of respondent 18.36 19.61 1.25**
(.22) (.68) (.56)
Literacy
.10 .03 -.08
(.03) (.03) (.05)
HH Size 3.19 2.51 -.68**
(.23) (.15) (.31)
HH Head Male
.55 .56 .02
(.04) (.08) (.09)
Table A1: Baseline Balancing for STUPs in Treatment and Control Spots
Treatment Control Difference
Panel A - Baseline Descriptive Statistics
Panel B - Time Allocation of the Respondents at Baseline
N
Panel B Notes:Total hours that the main female in the household spent during the previous year given by type of activity.
Entrepreneurship I is the mean for the responses to 6 questions about respondent's self-confidence in her entrepreneurial tasks. The 
responses can be 1=I definitely cannot do this task, 2=May be I can do this task, 3=I definitely can do this task. The tasks are to run 
your own business, to identify business opportunities to start up new business, to identify business opportunities to expand existing 
business, to save in order to invest in future business opportunities, to manage financial accounts, to estimates acccurately the costs 
of running a new business. Entrepreneurship II is the mean for the responses to 6 taks about responsent's self-confidence in her 
entrepreneurial skills, for tasks involving her interaction with others. The tasks are to bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are 
buying inputs for your business, to bargain to obtain high prices for your outputs, to protect your business from harm by others, to 
collect money someone owes you, to make sure employees get the work done properly, to obtian credit to start up new business ot to 
expand existing business.
244 82
Panel A Notes: Sample includes HHs that are connected to STUPs through their first degree family network and observations from 
baseline survey only. Total Pce, HH Durables Value, Business Assets' Value and Savings are given in Bangladeshi TAKAs. Total 
Pce includes value of food (calculated from last 3 days' consumption) and non-food items consumed in the HH. HH Durables 
include radio, bicycle, chair, table, chouki (bed), bednet. Business assets include land, livestock, power pump, plough, tractor, 
mowing machine, shed to keep livestock, shop premises, boat, fishnet, rickshaw/van, trees, cart. 
(47.37) (74.95) (92.56)
Leisure Hours 6326.87 6090.05 -236.82**
Household-chore Hours 1303.51 1636.34 332.83***
(30.18) (51.61) (60.04)
Maid Hours 105.04 62.93 -42.11
(26.41) (30.34) (48.86)
Day-Labor Hours 368.77 49.76 -319.01***
(37.55) (30.24) (67.15)
Treatment Control Difference
Husbandry Hours 607.89 923.05 315.16***
(28.45) (52.90) (57.86)
Entrepreneurship II 2.61 2.67 .06
(.03) (.06) (.06)
Entrepreneurship I 2.39 2.56 .17**
(.04) (.07) (.08)
Savings 845.39 903.60 58.21
(269.17) (344.40) (505.61)
Business Assets' Value 90338.7 86473.9 -3864.83
(24562.3) (27823.4) (45318.41)
HH Durables Value 778.14 1540.31 762.16***
(99.58) (388.60) (282.85)
Total Pce 7153.82 9467.73 2313.92***
(286.11) (1109.85) (803.12)
BMI of respondent 19.00 20.07 1.07***
(.17) (.33) (.35)
Literacy
.18 .17 -.01
(.03) (.04) (.05)
HH Size 4.02 3.38 -.64***
(.10) (.16) (.19)
HH Head Male
.91 .88 -.04
(.02) (.04) (.04)
Table A2: Baseline Balancing for STUPs' Family Network
Treatment Control Difference
Panel A - Baseline Descriptive Statistics
Panel B - Time Allocation of the Respondents at Baseline
N
Panel B Notes:Total hours that the main female in the household spent during the previous year given by type of activity.
Entrepreneurship I is the mean for the responses to 6 questions about respondent's self-confidence in her entrepreneurial tasks. The 
responses can be 1=I definitely cannot do this task, 2=May be I can do this task, 3=I definitely can do this task. The tasks are to run 
your own business, to identify business opportunities to start up new business, to identify business opportunities to expand existing 
business, to save in order to invest in future business opportunities, to manage financial accounts, to estimates acccurately the costs 
of running a new business. Entrepreneurship II is the mean for the responses to 6 taks about responsent's self-confidence in her 
entrepreneurial skills, for tasks involving her interaction with others. The tasks are to bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are 
buying inputs for your business, to bargain to obtain high prices for your outputs, to protect your business from harm by others, to 
collect money someone owes you, to make sure employees get the work done properly, to obtian credit to start up new business ot 
to expand existing business.
330 103
Panel A Notes: Sample includes HHs that are connected to STUPs through their informal insurance network (food exhange, 
assiatnce in times of crisis, any other transfers in cash/kind). The observations are those form the baseline survey only. Total Pce, 
HH Durables Value, Business Assets' Value and Savings are given in Bangladeshi TAKAs. Total Pce includes value of food 
(calculated from last 3 days' consumption) and non-food items consumed in the HH. HH Durables include radio, bicycle, chair, 
table, chouki (bed), bednet. Business assets include land, livestock, power pump, plough, tractor, mowing machine, shed to keep 
livestock, shop premises, boat, fishnet, rickshaw/van, trees, cart. 
(40.17) (61.65) (79.74)
Leisure Hours 6349.57 6171.03 -178.54**
Household-chore Hours 1278.78 1636.17 357.40***
(26.48) (47.08) (54.21)
Maid Hours 90.50 56.60 -33.90
(21.44) (22.88) (40.50)
Day-Labor Hours 360.09 35.0 -325.14***
(31.55) (20.79) (57.69)
Treatment Control Difference
Husbandry Hours 612.55 861.02 248.47***
(24.62) (44.27) (50.53)
Entrepreneurship II 2.61 2.67 .06
(.03) (.06) (.06)
Entrepreneurship I 2.39 2.58 .19***
(.03) (.06) (.07)
Savings 1032.71 1175.44 142.73
(307.21) (303.26) (757.69)
Business Assets' Value 178228.4 165403.8 -12824.67
(39445.26) (51033.9) (76169.02)
HH Durables Value 846.79 2178.13 1331.33***
(94.88) (478.96) (316.42)
Total Pce 8037.11 12385.93 4348.82***
(388.84) (2447.13) (1536.75)
BMI of respondent 19.0 20.28 1.28***
(.16) (.35) (.34)
Literacy
.21 .26 .05
(.02) (.04) (.05)
HH Size 4.13 3.60 -.53***
(.09) (.13) (.18)
HH Head Male
.90 .92 .03
(.02) (.03) (.03)
Table A3: Baseline Balancing for STUPs' Informal Insurance Network
Treatment Control Difference
Panel A - Baseline Descriptive Statistics
Panel B - Time Allocation of the Respondents at Baseline
N
Panel B Notes:Total hours that the main female in the household spent during the previous year given by type of activity.
Entrepreneurship I is the mean for the responses to 6 questions about respondent's self-confidence in her entrepreneurial tasks. The 
responses can be 1=I definitely cannot do this task, 2=May be I can do this task, 3=I definitely can do this task. The tasks are to run 
your own business, to identify business opportunities to start up new business, to identify business opportunities to expand existing 
business, to save in order to invest in future business opportunities, to manage financial accounts, to estimates acccurately the costs 
of running a new business. Entrepreneurship II is the mean for the responses to 6 taks about responsent's self-confidence in her 
entrepreneurial skills, for tasks involving her interaction with others. The tasks are to bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are 
buying inputs for your business, to bargain to obtain high prices for your outputs, to protect your business from harm by others, to 
collect money someone owes you, to make sure employees get the work done properly, to obtian credit to start up new business ot 
to expand existing business.
755 536
Panel A Notes: Sample includes HHs that are not connected to STUPs, through any family or economic network recorded in the 
survey. The observations are from the baseline survey only. Total Pce, HH Durables Value, Business Assets' Value and Savings are 
given in Bangladeshi TAKAs. Total Pce includes value of food (calculated from last 3 days' consumption) and non-food items 
consumed in the HH. HH Durables include radio, bicycle, chair, table, chouki (bed), bednet. Business assets include land, 
livestock, power pump, plough, tractor, mowing machine, shed to keep livestock, shop premises, boat, fishnet, rickshaw/van, trees, 
cart. 
(23.84) (29.90) (37.90)
Leisure Hours 6401.33 6270.39 -130.94***
Household-chore Hours 1472.45 1594.49 122.04***
(16.72) (20.04) (26.05)
Maid Hours 69.76 55.90 -13.87
(11.87) (12.30) (17.49)
Day-Labor Hours 66.05 21.01 -45.05***
(10.11) (6.22) (13.10)
Treatment Control Difference
Husbandry Hours 728.70 809.65 80.94***
(16.33) (20.68) (26.06)
Entrepreneurship II 2.63 2.63 .00
(.02) (.02) (.03)
Entrepreneurship I 2.52 2.48 -.04
(.02) (.03) (.03)
Savings 2717.30 1448.22 -1269.07
(1153.94) (310.80) (1394.50)
Business Assets' Value 271939.5 213042.6 -58896.91
(34691.42) (21054.73) (44835.45)
HH Durables Value 1824.04 2161.0 336.95
(253.61) (170.31) (33.47)
Total Pce 10693.16 12839.87 2146.70
(516.28) (2604.34) (2252.16)
BMI of respondent 19.81 20.44 .63***
(.12) (.14) (.18)
Literacy
.41 .34 -.07***
(.02) (.02) (.03)
HH Size 3.92 3.82 -.10
(.06) (.06) (.09)
HH Head Male
.92 .93 .01
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Table A4: Baseline Balancing for Those Outside the STUPs' Network 
Treatment Control Difference
